Nearly a year since I've posted.  Here's something.

I'm reading Mark Driscoll's Doctrine:  What Christians Should Believe.  Driscoll is an influential pastor, one who has pushed the early emergentist agenda yet is also a sort-of Calvinist; so he is one that attracts evangelical protestants from various sides.  He's also the guy that stirred up some recent brouhaha by making a certain tweet during the President's inauguration.

My problem, however, is with chapter 1 of his book, which "explains" the doctrine of the Trinity.

The subtitle of his book "What Christians Should Believe" makes me think that Driscoll takes the doctrine of the Trinity as he describes it in Chapter 1 as required for Christians.  I take it then that those "Christians" who deny the doctrine of the Trinity as he describes it are violating some epistemic norm for Christians.  But on what basis can he say that such a doctrine as he describes it must be believed by all Christians?  Certainly oneness pentacostals would dissent.  Perhaps Driscoll will cite the Bible as an authority (which is what he mostly does in Ch. 1); yet the oneness pentacostals will also cite Scripture as defending their position of a unipersonal God.  How can Driscoll justify his reading of the Scripture over the oneness pentacostal reading?  Catholics and Orthodox can appeal to Tradition and the Magisterium; but what can Driscoll appeal to other than insisting that his interpretation is the correct one (especially when he later writes that "our authority is not in creeds but in Scripture" p. 28)?

Secondly, I have lots of problems with the doctrine of the Trinity as Driscoll describes it.  Mostly, my problem is that I have no idea what he's describing (and I will be ignoring all the "proof-texts" he uses to defend the doctrine as he describes it; many of those support texts are contentious whether they show what he thinks they show).  What he describes seems confusing at best, incoherent at worst.  Here's his definition of the Trinity:

"one God who eternally exists as three distinct persons--Father, Son, and Spirit--who are each fully and equally God in eternal relation with each other" (Doctrine, p. 13).

By 'person', he means a being that "thinks, acts, feels, speaks, and relates" (ibid.).  So there are three beings (Father, Son, Spirit) that think, act, feel, speak, and relate.  He also says that each member of the Trinity possess properties such as being eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent.

He then defends the claim that there is one God, who is denoted in the Old Testament as "Yahweh".  So, Driscoll takes Yahweh to be the "Trinitarian God of the Bible".

Here is where we start to get into trouble.  Driscoll writes:

"Yahweh, The Trinitarian God of the Bible, is a person with the name "Lord"....Yahweh, the Trinitarian God of the bible, begins by telling Moses and us that he is a person" (ibid., p. 17).

But now I'm confused.  Driscoll states that the Trinitarian God is also a person.  So is that a fourth person, another being that "thinks, acts, feels, speaks, and relates" (which is his definition of a person)?  Some people think Yahweh refers only to the Father, so to call him a person is to call the Father a person (no big deal).  But how can Driscoll coherently call the Trinitarian God a person?  Do the three persons somehow make up another person?  But then wouldn't that be a fourth person?  Or if they don't make up another person (and so there are only three persons), then how can he say the Trinitarian God is a person?  Shouldn't it be that the Trinitarian God is a "community of persons" (where a community is not a person)?  Moreover, we can ask Driscoll whether Yahweh is omnipotent or omniscient.  I suspect he would say "yes".  But if so, given that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are omnipotent and omniscient (which he states above), then is Yahweh a fourth omnipotent and omniscient being?

I suspect Driscoll adopts some version of what is often called "social trinitarianism", especially when he writes "The Trinity is the first community and the ideal for all communities...the Trinity is the ideal community in every way" (ibid., p. 12) and his appeal to the notion of "perichoresis" or the "mutual indwelling" of the persons to explain divine unity (ibid., p. 26).  If so, he has to be careful with his language, or at the very least further elaborate what he means.  (aside:  what if someone denies social trinitarians (such as so-called "Latin trinitarians")?  Remember that this book is "what Christians should believe"... does that mean non-social trinitarians are violating some Christian epistemic norm? Driscoll is not being very "mere Christian" here)

More confusing statements:  "John is saying that Jesus Christ is full of Yahweh.  He has come to reveal the Father" (ibid., p. 19).

I admit the language just might not be clear (or I'm not understanding well), but it almost sounds as though Driscoll claims that Christ reveals the Father by being full of Yahweh (which is weird to say; he's full of a community of which he is a member).  It also sounds as though he's identifying the Father and Yahweh; but that can't be since he takes Yahweh to be the Trinitarian God (of which the Father is not identical, at least according to Driscoll's view).  Even if I'm misunderstanding or misinterpreting Driscoll, much of the problem is the slipperiness of the language and a lack of consistent usage.

Hearing a few of Driscoll's sermons, I take him to be a decent representative of a good many evangelicals.  So I am disconcerted when many evangelicals speak of God or the Trinity in the way Driscoll does, using unclear and inconsistent language (which may also evince an incoherent belief-system).

I should note that I do accept the doctrine of the Trinity, but not the doctrine as Driscoll describes it (a qualification I've used throughout this blog).  I just wish we Christians would be more careful with how we speak about it.  This is not to say that we can speak about it so clearly that all the mystery is removed (it is and will remain a mystery).  But we can speak of it without using inconsistent language (as many Christians do).  With that, I commend Fred Sanders' The Deep Things of God or Thomas McCall's Forsaken:  The Trinity and the Cross.  Of course I have some nit-picky concerns with their works, but both works (from theologians, not philosophers) are lucid and use language that makes clear what their view is.  We need more of that in the church.

Last thoughts on biblicism

C.S. Lewis wisely explained that scholars are prone to writing books in which the bulk is written on "The Problem", and the smaller section involves "The Solution", and he noted that it was hard to disagree with the large section, but that the errors were typically in the latter.

Smith's criticism of biblicism, I believe, is spot on, and I will join the choir of those who renounce it and will encourage others to do the same.  However, I have some lingering worries and questions:

1)  Smith considers epistemological foundationalism as dubious.  However, many of the subtleties of the position are side-stepped and not considered.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that Smith is a sociologist and not a professional philosopher (though much props to him, since he is a specialist who is extremely well-read in a whole host of other domains such as theology and philosophy--he is a model scholar and I hope to be the kind of "amateur" [in the non-pejorative sense] that he is).  It is not obvious to me that there is a clear cut path to these epistemological positions to the biblicist view.

  Moreover, he merely mentions his favored view, critical realism, without explaining clearly and without  much detail.  Now he has defended the position in another book (which he mentions in a footnote), so I won't criticize him too hard here, since I should read that other book (whenever I get the time).  But what he does say about it here, I'm not really sure what the view is.

2)  Smith thinks that we should abandon inerrantism about the Bible.  Not sure why he thinks so.  I understand that the motivation some people have for "proving" inerrantism have let them slip into biblicism.  But his criticism of biblicism and his proposed approach (which he provides a mere sketch) seems to me to be compatible with inerrantism (appropriately understood, and recognizing that the Bible is not merely an aggregate of indicative propositions that can have truth-values).  I think a lot of evangelicals would be more sympathetic to his critique if he left inerrantism alone or at least said that his account is compatible either with the truth or falsity of inerrantism (sadly, I think some evangelicals will dismiss his great work altogether because of this).

(Smith does, in the conclusion, say that his critique of biblicism neither falisfies divine inspiration nor inerrancy of the Scriptures.  However, in the text, his apparent criticism, I fear, may turn off those who need to hear his case)

3)  Smith suggests that "it is better to err on the side of a minimalist view of what is essential to Christian faith and life than a maximalist view...The more Christians insist on making long lists of theological 'essentials' that real or true Christians ought to believe in order to be recognized as within the bounds of the true faith and deserving the fellowship of communion, the more the body of Christ becomes conflicted, divided, and disunifed" (Smith, p. 146).

   My worry is how "low can you go".  Smith insists that we read the Scripture from the lens of Nicene and Chalcedonian Christology.  But perhaps that is not minimalist enough, since that excludes oneness pentacostals and other Bible-and-Jesus-lovin' folk.  Moreover, if we go extremely minimalist, it is not obvious why we would exclude certain groups that evangelicals currently do exclude, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, etc.  What is the minimal essential?  If it is the creeds, on what grounds can that be claimed (obvious I take it on the grounds of Tradition and the Magisterium; but Smith, though a committed Catholic, has tried to avoid association with these in order to provide an evangelical-friendly approach--but I'm not sure if that'll work)?  If not on the creeds, then why can't we minimalize the essentials so as to include Mormons and JW's, especially if we'll include oneness pentacostals?  Or if we don't include these groups, what is the principled reason why we don't?  That is, what determines whether we've gone "minimal" enough, and how far is too far?

All evangelicals should read this book.  I would even welcome evangelicals to challenge his conclusion, especially those who want to defend biblicism.  Although I would not want to do so, I can imagine that one way of going is by adopting an extreme form of "sticking to one's guns" regarding reasonable disagreement with peers and experts.

More on Biblicism

For the most part, I'm in hearty agreement with Smith's criticism of biblicism, and that evangelicals (or for that matter, Christians of any stripe) should abandon it.

Although he does not offer a full blown solution or alternative to biblicism (as the wise and the humble are oft found to do), he does suggest several rough sketches of a viable alternative that avoids the pitfalls of biblicism.

Briefly, the key to interpreting the Scriptures is by reading it through the lens of traditional Christology.  That is, we see the Scriptures as bearing witness to Jesus Christ, and that everything in it be read with that interpretive goal in mind.  This is compatible with a view of divine inspiration with or without also holding to the inerrancy of Scripture.  Moreover, it avoids the problem of seeing the Bible as a mere handbook or instruction manual for various facets of the human experience.

One worry I have with Smith's solution is that he merely asserts that it must be through this particular lens.  Here's what he says:

"This means that we always read scripture Christocentrically, christologically, and christotelically, as those who really believe what the Nicene and Chalcedonian creeds say...This also means that we always read the Bible as committed trinitarians, as those who do not merely "believe in God", but who actually believe in God in particular as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" (Bible Made Impossible, p. 98).

I haven't finished the book yet (the last chapter is partly on authority), but my worry is on what authoritative grounds can Smith assert that this is the "real way" to read the Bible.  After all, oneness pentacostals will object, for they will not read the Bible through the lens of the Nicene and Chalcedonian creeds, and that is true of some other Bible-and-Jesus-lovin' folk (e.g., Dale Tuggy).  Such Christians have a commitment to both the teachings of Scripture (as they see it) and to Jesus (even if they do not construe Him as being of the same substance as the Father), so why should they fall in line with Smith's hermeneutical approach as  opposed to some other?

Now I should say, I'm in firm agreement with Smith, that the Scriptures must be read in a Christocentric fashion, the Christology being what was affirmed in the Nicene-Constantinpolitan creed that followed the 2nd Ecumenical Council (380/1) and the Chalcedonian definition that followed the Council of Chalcedon (451).  But that is because I take it that Tradition is one of the pillars of authority, and that the proper Scriptural interpretation cannot be by some stand-alone methodology (favorable to those who trumpet "sola Scriptura") but requires Tradition and even the Magisterium (ack... I'm saying this as an evangelical Protestant... recall that I'm a methodist with a strong commitment to Wesleyan theology).

My worry is over the grounds by which Smith can charge other Christians who don't hold to Tradition, and so do not hold to the Creeds, into following his methodology as opposed to some other (perhaps, reading the Scripture Christologically and Christocentrically, but without thinking of Christ as being of the same substance as the Father and as not having two natures).

I'm thoroughly enjoying the book, and will likely finish it soon.  Definitely recommend for all evangelicals to read, even if they disagree with Smith.

Biblicism

No posts of recent.  So here's something.

I am currently reading Christian Smith's The Bible Made Impossible, where he argues that the standard conception of Biblical authority that is held by a wide majority of American evangelicals is not just problematic but internally incoherent.

The standard conception is "biblicism", which is basically the view that the Bible is the absolute, unerring, and final authority of both truths of the faith and over manner of living, such that the Bible serves as a kind of "handbook" or "instruction manual" for how Christians ought to live, and where no other source of authority is required to settle the matter.

The problem in short is that even if one claims that the Bible is inerrant or infallible, absolutely authoritative, etc., the actual practice has lead to what Smith calls "Pervasive Interpretative Pluralism" (or, what I'll call 'PIP' for short), which is the fact that many well-meaning, sincere, intelligent (evangelical) readers of the Bible will walk away with a whole host of different interpretations.

So even though Jones and Mary both say that the Bible is the absolute guide by which they will form their religious beliefs and will conduct their lives, it is not unlikely that Jones and Mary may diverge in what they believe and how they think they should live.  That is, there is widespread disagreement.  Given the so-called (democratic) perspicuity of the Scriptures, it seems strange that this would occur.  Nor can Jones and Mary resolve their disagreement by appealing to the Bible, since it is the very source of their conflicting views.

Now I have no real problems with there being disagreement of this sort, and it is, for the most part, just what I expect to happen.  For example, Smith lists several standard examples of disagreement, where the parties to the disagreement cite the Bible as "proof" or evidence for the correctness of their view.  Some of these are the disagreements over church government, Arminian vs. Calvinist understanding of providence (as well as freedom and predestination), gender roles (especially with respect to church leadership), charismatic gifts (e.g., tongues, prophecy), etc.  I suspect that there would be such disagreement since I take it that the Biblical evidence is underdetermined regarding many of these issues and positions.

However, Smith's main point is that many evangelicals believe that such issues can be resolved and certain positions endorsed as the Biblical position solely based on Scripture.  But this is impossible given the PIP that follows from biblicism.

I have a bigger worry than Smith's (though along the same lines).  Many evangelicals will consider these debates as "non-essential" doctrinal matters.  However, there is also PIP with respect to what many evangelicals would call "essential" doctrines.  For instance, the doctrine of the Trinity has been given various interpretations, over and above the creedal formulations.  Many argue that the creedal formulations cannot be derived directly form Scripture, and many evangelicals hold a theory of Trinity that in no way resembles the creedal formulations.  Furthermore, some evangelicals, like the oneness pentacostals, reject Trinitarianism altogether.  Now some may just consider them non-Christians, but that seems fairly hasty, especially given their commitment to the teachings of the Bible (they typically are biblicists) and allegiance to Jesus as their Savior (though he is not divine).  The evangelical cannot point to Bibical passages since some fellow evangelicals will say no Trinitarian passage is to be found (and will interpret differently the proposed passage that serves as evidence).  Thus, here is what looks to be an "essential" doctrine in which the pesky problem of PIP lurks.

Furthermore, there is the PIP with respect to what even counts as essential and non-essential.  C.S. Lewis takes the doctrine of the Trinity (in its creedal formulation) to be essential, whereas oneness pentacostals do not.  Some evangelicals take baptism to be an essential matter in the Christian life, whereas others do not (it is merely symbolic, an "outside expression of an inside decision" or something like that).  Some evangelicals take it as essential to the Christian life that one must accept a certain account of justification (some Reformers do), whereas others do not.  Given this kind of PIP about essential/non-essential matters, it becomes even more difficult to state any set of conditions by which we can clearly demarcate Christians from non-Christians (or at least evangelicals from non-evangelicals).

One lesson to draw.  Evangelicals should use the word 'heretic' and 'heresy' very scarcely and with a great deal of caution.

But my worry (of which many previous posts deal with) remains.  What is the unifying factor for evangelical protestantism?  It can no longer be the "teachings" found in the Bible, since the "teachings" are legion (at least for evangelicals that embrace biblicism).  If Smith is correct such that evangelicals must reject biblicism, where else can they turn regarding authoritative declarations over praxis and doxastic matters?  Smith claims at the outset that though he eventually became Catholic, that evangelicals don't necessarily have to even if they agree that they should reject biblicism.  But where else can they turn to authority?  Eventually they will turn to Tradition (along with Scripture), but Tradition itself will have some degree of PIP (though much less than biblicism).  Thus, the only remaining option seems to be a live, current authority, one in which division is not possible, and that looks an awful lot like the Magisterium, and in particular the see of Peter.

Wright vs. Piper

A standard Reformed account of justification includes the view that Christ's righteousness as being "imputed" into us (in Luther's phrase, the alien righteousness of Christ is somehow or other transferred onto genuine believers).

Bishop Wright has suggested that such a view, based on our understanding of the first century imagery of the law-court, makes no sense at all--the righteousness of the judge is a distinct concept from the righteousness of the defendant.  Thus, the conception of justification as an imputation of (one and the same) righteousness makes a serious category mistake.

Single meaning of 'justification' in Scripture?

Much controversy over the doctrine of justification arises from how the term is employed in Scripture.  Reformers such as John Piper tend to see it as the moment when the righteousness of Christ is imputed into us by our faith in him.  Evangelical dissenters such as N.T. Wright tend to see it as a declaration of membership or kinship in God's covenant relationship with His people.

The debate hinges on how such interpretations fit with various Scriptural passages.  But I wonder:  might the term 'justification' (and its cognates) be used in a non-univocal way throughout Scripture, and even by a single author (viz. St. Paul).

I am neither a biblical nor systematic theologian, and I don't pretend to fully understand and appreciate all the relevant issues.  But from my earnest attempt to understand Scripture as a layman (and by the illumination of the Spirit, from an evangelical point of view) and having read more theological texts concerning this issue than the average layman, I see no reason to think that the term is being applied univocally across the board.  If so, then it is up to the systematic theologian to construct a concept of justification that is faithful to some concept in the Scripture, even if there are syntactically similar terms that are employed in Scripture that differ in sense.  Furthermore, it seems that it would be a futile attempt to see if one's concept is supported by every instance of that term; rather, one should see if the concept is found in Scripture and attempt to embed it in overall framework that takes into account the other theological concepts in Scripture.

The same seems to be true of other concepts, e.g. grace, faith, righteousness, etc.  It is not obvious to me at any rate that terms such as 'grace' are being applied univocally--e.g., "stewardship of grace", "grace and peace to you", "justified by faith through grace", etc.  For instance, a standard meaning given to 'grace' by evangelicals is something along the lines of "unmerited favor"; but it is hard to see how that works ("the stewardship of unmerited favor" seems not to be what Paul is saying in Ephesians).

Evangelical Bickering

For theologians and Christian academics (and perhaps certain evangelicals "in the know"), a recent storm has been brewing among prominent evangelical leaders, namely between Norm Geisler and Michael Licona:

www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2011/november/interpretation-sparks-theology-debate.html

Various evangelical leaders (especially at Biola) have sided with Licona, suggesting that Geisler is overreacting in his judgment that Licona has abandoned the doctrine of inerrancy of Scripture (based on an interpretation of Matthew 27's account of "raised bodies"at Christ's death).

Now I am not surprised that such criticism and vehement response has occurred.  Remember that whole Rob Bell brou-ha-ha (which I finally read his book and think that it is less a book and more a long blog post, unworthy of serious response just as much as any of my blog posts).  J.P. Moreland also underwent much scrutiny when he presented a paper at an ETS meeting in which he argued against the dangers of idolizing the Bible and not using it in a proper manner.  Those who reside on the outside or fringe of evangelical conservatism get less heat; perhaps it is expected that they hold views contrary to the fold.  But those who are within the pack are often criticized if they begin to say anything that sounds as if they are straying from the center of the evangelical core.

What I wonder is how someone like Geisler can ask Licona to recant, or how he can call him "unorthodox" or "non-evangelical".  On what basis?  Whose orthodoxy?  Tradition or the Magisterium are ruled out.  The orthodoxy of conservative fundamentalists or evangelicals.  But who are they, for they are legion.  Do Moreland and William Lane Craig count as orthodox (although they hold a doctrine of the Incarnation that is fairly close to a condemned heresy, viz. Apollinarianism)?

And why does a re-interpretation of Matthew 27 no longer qualify Licona as an evangelical?  In fact, it makes him the model evangelical.  For he attempted to understand the Scripture based upon the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that is available to all believers and by serious scholarly research that applies appropriate hermeneutic techniques that respect the genre and context of the passage--everything that they teach us to do at evangelical universities.  There is no Tradition or Magisterium telling him that he got it wrong.  And if he arrived at his view based upon the method of Scriptural interpretation that is the paradigm of the evangelical approach, how can he be considered to be going against evangelicalism?

Again, I'm not surprised this happens, since it happens quite frequently--one evangelical calling another evangelical a heretic.  But if our only doctrinal or interpretative ground is the Scripture as understood from personal reading and the Spirit's witness, then whatever view comes from that, the evangelical must embrace if they are to be evangelical at all.

Vague boundaries

I suppose the gnawing worry that I have is that there seems to be no determinate boundary by which we can clearly say whether one falls under the label 'Christian' or not.  Or at least I cannot think of any necessary and sufficient conditions for what a Christian is.  (It is easier to attempt to do so for being RC or EO, and virtually impossible for being Protestant)

Reading some more of John Wesley recently, I've been wondering whether I've been approaching this in the wrong manner, and I've begun entertaining the possibility that there are no such (non-trivial, finitely long) conditions--that perhaps the boundaries of whether one counts as a Christian are a bit vague.

Socrates (at least as depicted by Plato) reminds us that it is extremely difficult to arrive at definitions of various concepts, nevertheless we can sometimes clearly indicate when something satisfies as being an instant of that concept.  For example, I cannot give you a definition of what virtue is, but I'm quite confident that courage and wisdom are examples of virtue; I cannot provide a definition of a game, but I'm sure that baseball counts as one.  Similarly, I cannot give a definition of what a Christian is (at least, one that is non-trivial and will exclude those who seem as though they should not count as members), but I can provide paradigmatic examples of members:  St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Mother Theresa, Billy Graham, etc.  Of course there will be controversial examples (controversial for some, if not for me), those cases that reside in the "gray", e.g. John Dominic Crossan, Marcus Borg, people who have non-orthodox beliefs but are committed to Jesus (oneness pentacostals, seventh-day adventists), etc.  Moreover, the vague boundaries may be merely epistemic; the boundaries might only appear vague due to our ignorance, and perhaps God is clearly aware as to who is a Christian and who isn't (maybe he possesses some definition of that concept that we cannot conceive due to our cognitive inability).

Perhaps, then, that "mere Christianity" is merely a matter of those who bear a relevant similarity with certain paradigmatic examples of being a Christian.  If this is right, I suspect it will be extremely hard for anyone to determinately call someone else a heretic, which might be for the better--at least from an evangelical protestant point of view.

Not sure.  Just thinking and learning as I go.

John Wesley and Catholic Spirit

There's the Pope, Luther, and Calvin duking it out.  Is there another alternative?

As should be obvious to those following this blog, I find myself unable to adhere to the traditions of those great magisterial reformers of the 16th and 17th century--though I agree with much of what they say (and have enormous respect for their theological prowess--every Christian ought to read Calvin's Institutes).

Although I've seemed quite RC-friendly in this blog, much of it is not due to my immediate avowal of RC--rather, it probably comes from my adherence to John Wesley and the Methodist tradition that I have been a part of for quite some time now.  Wesley is well known for offering an "olive branch" to both his Calvinist rivals as well as to RC.  His "middle of the road" approach is to be expected coming from one loyal to the Church of England, a "hybrid" of catholicism and protestantism (so to speak, though I take it to be a form of protestantism through and through).

Wesley, along with many other Christians (including myself), was concerned with the unity of the church.  Wesley found disunity and the lack of love amongst Christ's disciples as intolerable.

In one of his sermons, he speaks of the "catholic spirit".  The Scriptural text he bases his position on is 2 Kings 10:15:

   "And when Jehu was departed thence, he lighted on Jehonadab the son of Rechab coming to meet him, and he saluted him, and said to him, "Is thine heart right, as my heart is with thy heart?"  And Jehonadab answered, "It is." "If it be, give me thine hand"."

Wesley uses this case as an example of how Christians ought to regard other Christians.  Regardless of certain doctrinal differences (more to be said anon) and differences in praxis and modes of worship, if another Christian has a "right heart, as my heart is with thy heart", then we can be hand in hand in fellowship.  In this, "all the children of God may unite, notwithstanding these smaller differences" (Catholic Spirit).

Wesley accepts the reality and perhaps inevitability of doctrinal differences due to his very reasonable view that most (if not all) of us will be wrong at least about some matters.  He says, 

    "although every man necessarily believes that every particular opinion which he holds is true (for to believe an opinion is not true is the same thing as not to hold it), yet can no man be assured that all his own opinions, taken together, are true.  nay, every thinking man is assured they are not, seeing humanum est errare et nescire...although in what particulars he mistakes he does not, perhaps he cannot,  know" (Catholic Spirit).

Now Wesley asserts that one must belong to some church (one cannot be a Christian independent of other human beings), but that one must follow his or her own conscience as to which congregation he or she should join.

Wesley does not think just anyone can be a part of the "catholic spirit"; there are indeed some "essentials"--one must answer the affirmative to the following questions:

   "Dost thou believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, God over all, blessed forever?...Dost though know Jesus Christ and him crucified, and does he dwell in thee and though in him?...Having absolutely disclaimed all they own works, thy own righteousness, hast thou submitted thyself unto the righteousness of God, which is by faith in Christ Jesus?...Art thou, through him, fighting the good fight of faith, and laying hold of eternal life?...Doest thou love God with all thy heart, mind, soul, strength? Does though seek all thy happiness in him alone?...Is God the centre of thy soul, the sum of all thy desires?  Art thou accordingly laying up thy treasures in heaven and counting all things else dung and dross?...Art thou more afraid of displeasing God than either of death or hell?...dost thou hate all evil ways, every transgression of his holy and perfect law and herein exercise thyself to have a conscience void of offence toward God, and toward man?...Is they heart right toward they neighbor?...Do you show your love by your works?...may every Christian say, "Yea!" (Catholic Spirit).

So if one can say yes to these questions (and more that I left out), then one is part of the catholic spirit.  Still, answering the affirmative to these questions leaves open the possibility of one being part of the catholic spirit and yet being on the fringe or residing in the vague boundaries of being a Christian.  I take it that various oneness pentacostals and others who deny the orthodox conception of the Trinity (viz. one ousia in three hypostases) can easily say yes to all these questions (and perhaps, even seventh-day adventists, and perhaps even extreme liberal theologians depending on how some of these claims are to be interpreted).  Of course, it is not obvious (to me at any rate) why those particular questions (and the others I left out) must be answered in the affirmative--that is, it is not clear why those questions are essential and why other questions are not.  It would serve well to have further explanation as to why these doctrinal points are the ones that must be adhered to and why other points need not be (and Wesley himself, in other places, has suggested that Christians must accept the traditional doctrine of the Trinity; as I take Wesley, he wasn't always consistent, and much having to do with his lack of a systematic framework).

Nevertheless, once it is acknowledged as to who has their "heart right" with one another (that is, those who answer the series of questions in the affirmative), then there should be a deep love and affection for one another ("give me thine hand"), correcting one another and praying for each other.

Although not fully satisfied with every aspect, I sit somewhat comfortably within the halls of Methodism and being Wesleyan.  But again, there are nagging questions left unanswered.

Benedict XVI and Justification

Many Protestants are surprised by the following statement from Benedict XVI in his teachings on Paul the apostle:

"Being just [i.e., justified] means being with Christ and in Christ... Luther's phrase 'faith alone' is true, if it is not opposed to faith in charity, in love.  Faith is looking at Christ, entrusting oneself to Christ, being united to Christ, conformed to Christ, to his life.  And the form, the life of Christ, is love; hence to believe is to conform to Christ and to enter into his love" (St. Paul).

The Pope, in characteristic academic form, is careful to make an implicit distinction regarding the locution 'faith alone'.  For in catholic ears, it typically signifies a certain attitude or capacity that is primarily cognitive and, as such, does not include the virtues of hope and love.  Lutherans and some other Protestants typically use 'faith' to mean something more robust, and Benedict is careful to note that he is happy to agree with the doctrine of sola fides as long as it incorporates a robust conception that does incorporate love (both are permissible uses since there is no single use of the term in the Bible, and the term is used to connote different ideas depending on the context--and this is where exegesis and systematic theology come in to provide us a working category that will fit with one's overall theological framework).


For my own part, I would be happy to dismiss the locution altogether since it is not genuinely Biblical (but was an addition probably by Luther's followers in some manuscripts), at least not explicitly (and I would argue not implicitly, given James and other passages, e.g. Galatians 5).  But more dialogue must take place regarding our understanding of the doctrine of justification.  Catholics and Protestants both agree that we are justified by faith, but that is where agreement putatively ends.

Benedict XVI is one of the most Christocentric and Bibliocentric popes the Catholic Church has ever seen, and so now is a good time for dialogue between Rome and Protestants.

Kicked out of Geneva

If Geneva were around, I'd definitely get kicked out.  And not just me, but a whole host of contemporary evangelicals too.

Even disregarding the nasty ordeal with Servetus, if you disagreed with Calvin's theology, you were history.  In many ways then, Calvin seems to have taken on papal power over a small Swiss town.  And "decent Christian folk" such as (some of) you and me would be "ex-communicated".

I say this as one who has enormous and deep respect for Calvin.  Re-reading the Institutes, I am overwhelmed by his rhetorical and theological power.  And happily, I agree with almost everything he writes--especially when he focuses on the unity with Christ.

Scripture and Tradition

Although we often hear of the reformers eschewing tradition, it was only the radical reformers (e.g. Anabaptists) who did so completely.  The magisterial reformers, such as Luther and Calvin, held firmly to the tradition of the patristics.

However, their humanist tendencies to "return back to the sources" and to include the laity into the priesthood of all believers led to a commitment that each individual could interpret the Scripture for himself/herself.  But this, too, was not consistently followed, as Luther prohibited those students who did not have a mastery over Greek and Latin to read the Bible for themselves (such students had to settle with Luther's own pen in the Lesser Catechism).

Many contemporary protestants seem to have taken the radical reformed line regarding the interpretation of Scripture, and I think that this has made doctrinal unity virtually impossible to uphold.  The magisterial reformers were keen on maintaining doctrinal unity with the patristics (up to Augustine) even if there would no longer be any historical continuity given the break from the visible Roman church.  But the dispute between Zwingli and Luther over the sacrament of the Eucharist is well known, and both parties appealed to Scripture ("this is my body") to support their own position.  If Scripture is its own interpreter, what can adjudicate such disputes?

Consider even the current situation in which a whole host of Bible-lovin' Christians reject the orthodox conception of the Trinity.  They are using the same text as Trinitarians, so the Trinitarian has nothing more to use that can convince the non-Trinitarian if all that can be used is the Bible (a la Sola Scriptura).  The same goes for those who do not think Jesus is divine.  As with most heresies, the heretics often appealed to the Scripture to defend their position.

At the same time, I hear many protestants who claim that every Christian must accept the orthodox doctrine of the trinity and the high christology espoused in the Chalcedonian Definition.  But unless one takes seriously the authority of creeds and councils, why can't a protestant reject these definitions and pronouncements, especially if they believe it is not taught in Scripture or is not the best explanation of the Scriptural data?  That is, it is consistent within a protestant's belief-system to reject such claims.  If so, then I believe that "mere Christianity" as grounded in doctrinal unity alone to be virtually impossible from a Sola Scritpura framework given the difficulty of understanding the Biblical text and the ongoing division and disagreement over various beliefs and practices that purport to be grounded in Scripture.

(This is leaving out all the problems I have with the notion of Sola Scriptura, which I will address at some later point).

Quickies on Justification and Predestination

Both Luther (an Augustinian monk) and Calvin cite Augustine time and time again, and it seems that their theological views (especially on justification) are supported by the venerable father of the western church.

But there is a clear break between Augustine and the magisterial reformers, especially on the doctrine of justification.  Of course, they all agreed that God graciously justifies us, not as something we earned (though we receive by faith), but as freely given.

However, Luther and Calvin both treat righteousness as merely an external element (something imputed to us), that we are not righteous but only regarded as righteous (more Luther than Calvin [especially considering Luther's conception of "alien righteousness], but Calvin's notion of justification seems to be in line with this "externalist" framework).  On the other hand, Augustine considers God not merely treating as though we are righteous but as actually imparting or infusing His righteousness into us.  So it is still a reception of something "undeserved", but there is a real, internal change that occurs inside the one who receives the grace of God through faith.  I get tired, then, of hearing contemporary Reformed folk speak as if Augustine is on their side when there is this important difference (and where Augustine's view here fits more with the Council of Trent).

One final remark.  It's too bad that Calvin is either reduced to TULIP (which is anachronistic, since the Canons of Dort were established after Calvin's death) or to the doctrine of predestination.

Calvin's treatment of predestination (in Book III of the Institutes) isn't a stand alone doctrine but is interwoven in his theology of redemption through Christ.  The current frenzy over predestination stems from later Calvinists who take Calvin's account and just run with it (such as Beza).  I find that I cannot talk to many Reformed folk without having the discussion become centrally about (some extreme version of) divine sovereignty and election.  I find it refreshing that Calvin had much more to say about other topics.

Now I don't subscribe to Calvin's "double predestination" view, but I think there is also much confusion when I hear folk talk about the "free will vs. predestination" issue.  I won't go into the issue here (since it doesn't have much to do with my concerns in this blog), but I take it that Christians should adopt a doctrine of predestination--and with many other doctrines (such as the atonement), there are a multitude of rival conceptions such that it would be improper to say that there is such a thing as the doctrine of predestination.*

*(I say all this as a libertarian about human freedom)

John Piper on RC

I have much respect for John Piper (heard him speak when I was in England while he was there on a speaking tour).

I'm glad that he thinks justification is the key issue he would confront the Pope with (though he thinks there are other issues in which RC gets it wrong, e.g. papal authority, the nature of the mass, etc.). But again, I just cannot accept his view of justification as one in which Christ's righteousness is "imputed" by "faith alone".

I should also say that I do wholeheartedly accept the claim justification by faith... we are justified by faith indeed! God is the efficient cause of my being justified as well as my even having faith.

But nowhere in Scripture do I find the notion of justification by imputation (where it is solely an extrinsic, external matter) nor of faith alone (and the epistle of James tells me otherwise).

Will someone please let me know whether I've erred about this and why, because this is a huge separation between me and the magisterial Reformers--which would then be a short hop, skip, and step to RC.

(I've read Piper's response book to Wright's book on justification; and so far, Piper's case doesn't seem very convincing... sigh...)

More on Justification

Growing up, this is roughly the picture of justification that I had.  I first went to a baptist church, then a presbyterian one, and virtually everyone I knew held to something like this (though we wouldn't have used fancy terms such as 'imputation', and we almost never talked about 'justification' but tended to use locutions such as "being saved", "being born again", "accepting Jesus into your heart", etc.).

Let's see.  I accept that there is me (not as skinny) with a frowny face (because of my sin I suppose) and that there is Christ, I suppose signified by the cross (though Romans 4:25 seems to suggest that the crucifixion is only a part of the total justificatory event).  I accept the black cloud of guilt (which, by the way, is an awesome name for a metal band), and I accept the yellow cloud of righteousness.

I also am okay with the blue double-arrow 'transfer', but what I hesitate to endorse is the notion of transfer by imputation.

What I think that means is that despite my current sin, God (I suppose some mean here the Father) no longer regards me as guilty, and so I am completely forgiven of my sins since all that is being acknowledged by God is the righteousness of Christ which has been "imputed" but not "infused" (that is, it is merely an extrinsic change).  So I'm not really righteous, but God will "let me into heaven" since all that he takes into account is Christ's righteousness.  This is so even if there is no literal, intrinsic change in me.

I take this to be the fundamental dividing point between the early reformers and RC.  Here's what Calvin says:

"What is justification?  They deny that it is merely the forgiveness of sins, and insist that it includes both renovation and sanctification... There is no room for the vulgar quibble that Paul is speaking of the beginning of justification [in 2 Corinthians 5:19, Romans 4:6]; for in both places he is showing, not how men who had hitherto been unbelievers begin to be righteous, but how they retain the righteousness which they have once procured during the whole course of life" (Calvin Antidote to the Council of Trent).

Of course, Calvin (like Luther) still thinks there is a place for sanctification and regeneration, which takes place by the Spirit due to one's union with Christ:

"We acknowledge, then, that as soon as any one is justified, renewal also necessarily follows:  and there is no dispute as to whether or not Christ sanctifies all whom he justifies" (ibid.).

However, he stresses that justification is, nevertheless, an external matter:

"The Fathers of Trent pretend that it is twofold, as if we were justified partly by forgiveness of sins and partly by spiritual regeneration... I maintain that it is one, and simple, and is wholly included in the gratuitous acceptance of God.  I besides hold that it is without us, because we are righteous in Christ only.  Let them produce evidence from Scripture, if they have any, to convince us of their doctrine" (ibid.) [my emphasis].

This will, I believe, be the main division between the Reformers and me.  First of all, I think the best evidence of Scripture does not support a theory of justificatory-imputation (good luck finding 'imputation' in the Bible).  Second, I think that a proper account of justification will include much more than mere forgiveness of sins (I'll say a lot more on this later, but my thinking on this matter has been heavily influenced by Protestant folk such as N.T. Wright and Dallas Willard).

I suppose that one can disagree with the Reformers and remain protestant (just as Wright and Willard, and a whole host of Christians who take justification to be more than forgiveness of sins--I think most contemporary evangelicals that don't have a Calvinistic or Reformed bent would hold to a theory of justification similar to mine, since I was, after all, influenced mostly by contemporary evangelicals).  But my question then would be, "What is the reason for remaining separated?".  If, like me, one thinks that unity is a necessary condition for the Church unless there is some overriding reason (such as a major disagreement over justification), then if there are many whose understanding of justification is compatible with RC, then why not join? *

One could respond and say, "Well, you're clearly not a reformed believer, but you might be something else, perhaps Wesleyan, perhaps Anglican, perhaps emergent, perhaps non-denominational, perhaps fundamentalist evangelical, perhaps health-and-wealth-Joel-Osteen-shiny-white-teeth-er, etc..  There are a whole host of other options for protestants besides being Reformed or Lutheran".

I will eventually examine protestants of different varieties, not just the magisterial reformers.  But these guys were the big-daddies, so I don't mind spending extra time here.

*(I'm not that naive.  Of course many protestants will say, "Because we don't accept the Pope", or "Look at all the corruption in the Roman church", or "They worship Mary and other saints", or "They believe in all this extra-biblical stuff like purgatory", or "they think you get saved by works", or....  I will in time address all these issues, God willing.  But I still think the main divide is over justification; and if there is no reason to accept the Luther/Calvin account and if one has an account compatible with RC, then I wonder if it is incumbent on us to join the church despite disagreements on other issues that I take to be marginal).

Calvin and U-N-I-T-Y

Okay, back to the regular stuff. Some remarks on unity by Calvin:

"Always, both by word and deed, have I protested how eager I was for unity.  Mine, however, was a unity of the Church, which should begin with thee and end in thee....nor did I think that I dissented from thy Church, because I was at war with those leaders; for thou hast forewarned me, both by thy Son and by the apostles, that that place would be occupied by persons to whom I ought by no means to consent...and the apostles declared that there would be no enemies of thy Church more pestilential than those from within, who should conceal themselves under the title of pastors.  Why should I have hesitated to separate myself from persons whom they forewarned me to hold as enemies?  I had before my eyes the examples of thy prophets, who I saw had a similar contest with the priests and prophets of their day, though these were undoubtedly the rulers of the Church among the Israelitish people.  But thy prophets are not regarded as schismatics...They still remained in the unity of the Church" (Reply to Cardinal Sadolet).

Calvin seems to believe that despite the reformation movement unity is nevertheless perserved, and hence that invisible unity (and visible dispersion) of the Church is adequate.  Moreover, he thinks that such a state of affairs is preferable than the visible unity of a Church hankered with "strange doctrines" and "superstitions" (such as transubstantiation, confession and penance, revering saints and icons, papal rule, indulgences, etc.).

For awhile now, I've been hoping that invisible unity would be sufficient to preserve the kind of love and harmony that Christ and Paul had exhorted for the disciples.  These days, I'm less sure of that.  For what would be the (invisible) relation that holds the disciples of Christ together?  The most obvious answer would be a set of beliefs and practices, perhaps the ones laid out in C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity.  However, I don't think that these "fundamentals" are either sufficient or even necessary to count one as a Christian of any denominational stripe (I'll say more on this at some point).

Another answer could be, as Calvin seems to say, Christ Himself (or in another way, God "Himself"--supposing that 'God' refers to a self).  But this answer is either trivially true such that it is uninformative as how we ought to actually live out in unity, or it says too little and so again is not clear as to how we ought to actually bring unity about.

RC has an easy answer to this, which is the fellowship that is grounded in doctrine, the sacraments, and the magisterium.  Regarding the first, there is no problem as the one that besets protestant unity (I'll say more on this... but this should be obvious given the recent up-in-arms from evangelical protestants [especially the reformed variety] against Rob Bell).  The second is something I'll say more about later as well.  As to the third, it is grounded by Christ's establishment of Peter's role, and the ecumenical bond that is preserved through apostolic succession--the membership in a lineage that begins with Christ and the apostles and moves all the way up to the present with the Roman See (of course EO can make a similar claim too).  Thus, Benedict XVI is a symbol of a unity that is both synchronic (all the faithful throughout the world) and diachronic (all the faithful past and present); and this unity is clearly visible.

Another way of putting it is that RC finds unity in Christ Himself.  However, unlike the protestant claim, there is much more substantive content to what that means--it has more meat for me to sink my teeth into.

I'm still somewhat hopeful for the possibility of protestants discovering a means to maintain unity (and of course, it will have to be grounded in Christ Himself).  But unless we evangelical protestants can say more, I take this to be a knock against our side.

(and if anyone has reasons for believing unity [whether visible or invisible] is not required, I'd like to hear it... though I currently take it as a non-starter given Matthew 17)

The J-word...

Again, I take the central issue of the division between RC and Protestantism to be over the proper understanding of justification.  Calvin, like Luther, claimed that the Roman church's negligence (if not altogether elimination) of the doctrine of justification by faith to have vitiated the Church:

"[you, Cardinal Sadolet] touch upon justification by faith, the first and keenest subject of controversy between us...Wherever the knowledge of it is taken away, the glory of Christ is extinguished, religion abolished, the Church destroyed, and the hope of salvation utterly overthrown.  That doctrine...we maintain that you have nefariously effaced from the memory of men...and the gross ignorance of this doctrine, which even still continues in all your churches, declares that our complaint is by no means ill founded" (Reply to Cardinal Sadolet).

Again, I'll have more to say about this issue (viz., justification by faith).  I should say that Calvin, along with Luther, seems to be mostly familiar with and seems to mainly target the Ockhamistic line of Roman theology (this is not to say they were unaware of the theology of St. Thomas, but much of their criticisms on this matter would not affect his views).

Calvin goes on to write:

"If you would attend to the true meaning of the term 'justifying' in Scripture, you would have no difficulty.  For it does not refer to a man's own righteousness, but to the mercy of God, which, contrary to the sinner's deserts, accepts of a righteousness for him, and that by not imputing his unrighteousness...Hence [Paul's] familiar inference--if by faith, then not by works.  On the other hand--if by works, then not by faith...We constantly maintain, that man is not only justified freely once for all, without any merit of works, but that on this gratuitous justification the salvation of man perpetually depends.  Nor is it possible that any work of man can be accepted by God unless it be gratuitously approved" (ibid.).

But a few years later when the Council of Trent takes place, I get the sense that these two parties are talking past each other (not in all matters, but at least partially).  Calvin has much to say in response to the Council of Trent, and I'll take up that matter soon.

Calvin also thinks that justification by faith does not exclude the room for works in the Christian life, though he does not think that they "are worth one single straw" when it comes to justification.

"We deny that good works have any share in justification, but we claim full authority for them in the lives of the righteous.  For, if he who has obtained justification possesses Christ, and... Christ never is where his Spirit is not, it is obvious that gratuitous righteousness is necessarily connected with regeneration...for faith cannot apprehend Christ for righteousness without the Spirit of sanctification" (ibid.).

More needs to be said later, but it is union with Christ that results in both justification and regeneration.

One thing I want to mention regarding the anti-works of some contemporary Calvinists.  I once heard a sermon by a Reformed pastor who said that the only thing we need to do is "Just believe!", and that resting (which he gave sleeping as an example) is one of the best things we can do in this life. Again, some more disconnect between modern Calvinists and Calvin (recall that even Luther does not want to repudiate the importance of works).

Thus, Calvin considers faith and works inseparable because of the activity of Christ and the Spirit in the life of the Christian.

"Christ regenerates to a blessed life those whom he justifies, and after rescuing them from the dominion of sin, hands them over to the dominion of righteousness, transforms them into the image of God, and so trains them by his Spirit into obedience to his will" (ibid.).

Amen, brother, amen.  However, St. Thomas would say 'Amen' as well.  Hmm...   I think Calvin is exactly right on this point, but I see no significant difference here with what RC teaches.  This is not to say that there are no important differences, but at least with respect to this important aspect of Christ's activity in our lives, there is much overlap.

(sorry that this post is a bit scattered... super busy with traveling and such...  but heck, this is a blog, so deal with it!)

Which team is Augustine on?

Although many Protestant churches seem to have no concern with maintaining continuity with the historical church, Calvin not only deemed it important but believed that he and the fellow reformers were more in line with the doctrine and practice of the early church.  Here's what he writes:

"With this Church we deny that we have any disagreement.  Nay, rather, as we revere her as our mother, so we desire to remain in her bosom... For you teach that all which has been approved for fifteen hundred years or more, by the uniform consent of the faithful, is, by our headstrong rashness, torn up and destroyed... I will make it palpable to all that you knew... not only that our agreement with antiquity is far closer than yours, but that all we have attempted has been to renew that ancient form of the Church, which, at first sullied and distorted by illiterate men of indifferent character, was afterwards flagitiously mangled and almost destroyed by the Roman Pontiff and his faction" (Reply to the Letter by Cardinal Sadolet).

He goes on to write:

"I will not press you so closely as to call you back to that form which the Apostles instituted, (though in it we have the only model of a true Church, and whoever deviates from it in the smallest degree is in error)... that ancient form of the Church, such as their writings prove it to have been in the age of Chrysostom and Basil, among the Greeks, and of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Augustine, among the Latins; after so doing, contemplate the ruins of that Church, as now surviving among yourselves" (ibid).

And,

"That in all these points [viz. being against transubstantiation, indulgences, reverence of icons and saints, confession and penance, etc.], the ancient Church is clearly on our side, and opposes you, not less than we ourselves do" (ibid).

So Calvin believed that he is on the side of the early church and that the Roman Church had wrecked and destroyed the proper continuity of the church.

A few questions and thoughts:

[i] Why think that the early church (whether the church depicted in the NT or the church of the apostolic fathers, or even the church of the later fathers [both East and West] that Calvin cites) is the "only model of a true Church"?  Already by the time of Basil and Augustine there seems to be several innovations not explicitly found in Scripture.  Moreover, the situation of the church in the NT era was radically different from the situation of the later church having to deal with additional political pressures and persecution (and not to mention when Christianity became the official religion of Rome such that the church was placed in new circumstances and had to deal with further struggles and problems).  From being a small, localized religion that met mostly in homes to becoming the foundation of an empire requires a lot!  So it is not obvious to me that the early church (whichever one is being cited) is the right paradigm (though I do think continuity with the early church is essential, but I don't think that means the exclusion of all innovations).

[ii] Is the theology of the church of Geneva (or any of the Reformed churches) more in line with the thought of the early church?  When Ignatius of Antioch claims that there is no church without the bishop, it's hard to see how this is more compatible with Calvin than with RC.  Nevertheless, I do appreciate that Calvin is attempting to stay on the same team as the early church.  So we should ask whether Calvin or RC has the better claim to being the proper successors of the early church.

[iii] To say that the early church is on Calvin's side with respect to certain doctrines and practices seems to employ a dubious argument from silence.  Certainly the church fathers did not endorse and in some cases never conceived of some of these doctrines and practices of RC.  Nevertheless, given new situations and (perhaps) further revelation from the Spirit, it is not clear that we should eschew them simply because there is no mention of them by the early church.  Now I don't think any innovation is permissible, but I do think that innovation was inevitable given the kind of growth (in membership as well as influence and power) that the church experienced.  Moreover, I think that the innovation must be both compatible with Scripture as well as being a natural outgrowth of the church's already existing dogmas (e.g., I take the three hypostases and one ousia account of the Trinity to be compatible with Scripture [though obviously not explicitly taught there] and an organic development from what the church already believed, which was occasioned by the need to address various other developments that appeared to break from Scripture and the existing tradition [e.g., Arianism]).

Introducing Calvin

Forgive the lack of posts; I've been extremely busy these past few months.  I've finished what I wanted to read of Luther, though I haven't posted everything I wanted to say about his theology--I will return to some key issues later in a much more systematic fashion.  For now, I've moved on to John Calvin.

I sadly admit that as a youth, my only knowledge of Calvin was the menacing prodigy pictured above.  I attended a Presbyterian church, but I always felt a gap between the theology of my pastor and my own inclinations (I had no well-formulated views at the time).  It was not until college that I was first introduced to Calvin (and Hobbes as well, both depicted below in this awesome drawing):

I should say that I really enjoy reading him (at least, much more than reading Luther).  I am no Calvinist, and many Calvinists bug me (even hardcore Calvinist John Piper has said some of them need to be nicer and come off less arrogant).  Though I should say that some of my best friends are Calvinists and do not bug me.  But when I read Calvin, he doesn't bug me at all.  If only more Calvinists were like Calvin.  I actually find his approach refreshing.  More substantive stuff to come...

Sacraments, Supper and Scripture

Of the seven sacraments, Luther accepts only three as legitimate:  the Eucharist, Baptism, and Penance.  The last one is not typically held by most evangelical Protestants.

One of Luther's big beef against the Roman church at the time (besides his newly found understanding of justification and righteousness) was over the practice of administering the communion.  In fact, he seems to think that the error of the Roman church in this matter was so great that it gave "occasion for a schism in the church" (Luther The Pagan Servitude of the Church).  There are three ways regarding the Eucharist in which the Church erred according to Luther:

  [1]  Giving only the bread and not the wine to the laity.

  [2]  Espousal of the doctrine of transubstantiation in Thomistic terms.

  [3]  Construal of mass as a good work or a sacrifice.

I don't have much to say about [1] right now, though Luther also believed that it is permissible to consume only one of the elements if one so chooses (but the laity should be permitted to consume both if they so wish).

Regarding [2], Luther's criticism of the account of transubstantiation as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas is quite unfair.  He charges St. Thomas of not only relying on Aristotle in matters of faith but also of misunderstanding Aristotle.  Luther is definitely not a fan of Scholastic theology which made use of "the specious philosophy of Aristotle [which] took root in the church" (PSotC).  It seems that for Luther, certain matters of faith cannot be comprehended through such analytic forms of reasoning.

One big problem is that Luther does not seem to properly understand St. Thomas' view.  This is evident by remarks such as "Why could not Christ maintain His body within the substance of the bread as truly as within its accidents?" (PSotC).  Anyone who is aware of Thomistic metaphysics involving substantial forms and the distinction between substantial and accidental changes can easily give a reply.  Since my present concern is not over Thomistic philosophy, I'll let this one go.

So Luther adamantly maintains that what the priest is holding up is both fully bread and fully the body of Christ, and that we should believe this from a "simple faith".

Luther rejects [3] since he takes the mass to be a promise of God which we accept by faith (not works).  Thus, it is not a good work nor a sacrifice (which is a kind of work) since it is something we receive (and not something we offer or actively perform).  One point that needs to be made is that RC does think of the mass as a sacrifice, but it is not our sacrifice but Christ's sacrifice--the one and only sacrifice that is made present through the mystery of the Eucharist; and it is something we freely receive.

I do agree with Luther that there was a definite need of reform (whether the actual events in which the Protestant Reformation took place is justifiable is another question, one which I don't have an answer to).  The unfortunate business with Tetzel (and in some ways, Leo X) involved what looked to be more like the desire for monetary gain as opposed to spiritual growth.  As Luther states, "this sacred testament of God has been forced into the service of impious greed for gain by the opinions and traditions of irreligious men" (PSotC).  This is what needed major reform (though in principle, I am not opposed to raising money for the creation of beauty--making money to build St. Peter's basilica is not in itself problematic).  What was problematic was the acquisition of finances by the selling of indulgences.  I actually have no problem with the system of indulgences (and my acceptance of Charles Williams' "substitutionary love" and St. Paul's claim of a mystical link that ties all the members of the body of Christ lead me to believe that something like the transference of the merits of Christ and saints is possible, with the appropriate conception of "merit" in play).  However, such a system should not have monetary use; and RC eventually learned that lesson by proscribing the selling of indulgences (though not abandoning the distribution of indulgences altogether).

One final issue.  Consider what Luther says here:

   "Now the closer our mass resembles the first mass of all, which Christ celebrated at the Last Supper, the more Christian it will be" (PSotC).

Moreover, Luther is hesitant in accepting the doctrine of transubtantiation and the legitimacy of other sacraments since it has no Scriptural basis.  Here are some of my concerns:

   [i]  Scripture does not describe every practice in detail, so it is hard to know if we are following the practice as completely as was performed by the disciples in Scripture.  That is, unless one takes an extremely naive reading of many passages, there is much left out such that if we followed the practice as described in the text, our performance would not resemble the original practices at all (for instance, the part of the Lord's Supper that is described in the Scriptures was just a part of the entire passover meal, which is indicated by the fact that the cup which the Lord passed around was the 3rd cup of four in the Passover meal as indicated by St. Paul's claim that it is the "cup of blessing" and is followed by a hymn which the disciples sing afterward--thus, if we wanted to closely follow the early practice, we would have to engage in many activities not described in the text).

    [ii]  Luther seems to permit no room for development in doctrine or in practice here.  Thus, we get an extreme form of Sola Scriptura (of which I will write about extensively at some future time).  But why is there no such room?  The forming of the canon seems to be a kind of development and innovation, along with the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity (which brings us back to Luther's eschewing of Aristotle, which is odd since the orthodox conception of the Trinity heavily relies on Aristotelian [and more broadly, ancient Greek philosophical] notions such as substance (ousia, hypostasis), notions not found in Scripture).  The question to ask is whether there is any permissible form of development and innovation apart from Scripture (and again, I will say more about this later).

   [iii]  Another thing to note is Luther's anti-ceremonialism and a desire to return to the "simplicity" of faith.  I completely agree with Luther that the simple faith is what matters most.  But it should not be the whole story.  For instance, what matters most regarding my marriage is not that I buy my wife expensive jewelry or that we go on extravagant dates but that we genuinely love each other.  And we can love each other simply and have no less love even when we are eating at McDonald's.  However, one does not want to express that love at McD's but at a romantic walk on the beach under the moonlight.  I could give my wife a ring from Cracker Jack as a token of our love, but I'd rather give her a diamond ring.  Another way of putting it (cf. Thomas Howard) is to see ourselves as ceremonial by nature.  We humans love to participate in ceremonies.  We celebrate (or observe) birthdays, weddings, funerals, etc.  And we form traditions that we like to follow, such as having a cake with candles, balloons, stockings, a white dress, black attire, flowers, etc.  Part of being human is being traditional and ceremonial.  These things may not be essential in a sense, but they are a natural and desirable part of being human.

  [iv]  Luther accepts paedobaptism (that is, infant-baptism), yet such a practice does not seem to have a Scriptural basis (at least, not a direct one--yes, yes, I know the arguments of paedobaptists such as its link to circumcision, etc.).  So there seems to be, at least, a prima facie tension between Luther's acceptance of paedobaptism and his espousal of Sola Scriptura.  

Praise when it's due

I've been a bit hard on Luther, but mostly because I agree with the majority of what he says and feel impelled to write only on matters of disagreement.

So I have much admiration and respect for Luther.  One aspect I genuinely appreciate is his trinitarian approach to various doctrines.  An unfortunate feature in many contemporary Christians I've encountered is the neglect of trinitarian thought in both belief and practice.  That is, many of these Christians have an obscure belief regarding a three something and a one something, and their belief does not inform other beliefs regarding salvation and grace and does not inform practices such as worship and prayer.

Luther, on the other hand, has a very trinitarian view on grace (see my earlier post "On Grace").  Regarding the Apostle's Creed, here's what Luther states:

    "You, however, should divide the Creed into the main parts indicated by the fact that there are three persons:  God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; since I believe in God the Father, I believe in God the Son, and I believe in God the Holy Spirit, who are one God.  Thus you can divide each separate article [of the Apostle's Creed] into its parts." (Sermons on the Catechism)

The three parts of the Creed are concerning the Father as creator, the Son as Lord and redeemer, and the Holy Spirit as sanctifier.  Although much more can be said regarding the Trinity in the creeds, I appreciate the fact that Luther is working within a trinitarian framework, one that is not on the sidelines and the outskirts of his noetic-system but at the heart of his beliefs and practices.

One more point for good measure.  Many Protestants have a hard time with RC's statement that the Church is one's mother.  But Luther agrees with RC here given his proper understanding of our life in the church and its relation to us, for "the Christian church is your mother, who gives birth to you and bears you through the Word" (SotC).  Indeed, Luther thinks that the true Church is not under the papacy; however, his view of the church is certainly anti-individualistic when compared to many so-called Christians today who believe they do not need to be a member of a church.*


*(Of course there are elements in Luther's theology that I find objectionably individualistic.  However, Luther's individualism is still not as egotistical and self-serving as some brands of Protestantism today).

Free will

Luther's well-known reply to Erasmus regarding free will is quite convoluted.  A few remarks.

Consider what Luther states here:

    "[O]ur aim is, simply, to investigate what ability 'free-will' has, in what respect it is the subject of Divine action and how it stands related to the grace of God.  If we know nothing of these things, we shall know nothing of Christianity, and shall be in worse case than any people on earth!" (The Bondage of the Will).

And one wonders why contemporary Protestants are obsessed with debates over free-will!  I take it that Luther considers his view of free-will as an essential item of faith, though many Protestants today would regard it as one of the non-essential, disputable points.  But Luther's claim seems way too strong in that if we do not appropriately understand free-will and its relation to God, then we know "nothing of Christianity".

I also enjoy comments by him such as this:

    "It is fundamentally necessary and wholesome for Christians to know that God foreknows nothing contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His own immutable, eternal and infallible will.  This bombshell knocks 'free-will' flat, and utterly shatters it; so that those who want to assert it must either deny my bombshell, or pretend not to notice it, or find some other way of dodging it" (BotW).

I'm not sure what the "bombshell" is supposed to be since many free-will lovin' Christians will accept the claim in the first sentence.  As one interested in philosophy, I'm aching to write more about Luther's conception of human freedom, but since it doesn't pertain much to Reformation thought, I'll pass it by.

Though one thing I can't pass is Luther's impatience for subtle distinctions:

    "[T]hey maintained that all things take place necessarily, but by necessity of consequence, and not by necessity of the thing consequent...I shall not find it hard to show how unreal the distinction is... By necessity of consequence, they mean...[that] if God wills something, then it must needs be; but that which thus comes to be is something which of itself need not be...that is, it has no necessity in its own essential nature:  which is just to say that the thing done is not God Himself!" (BotW).

That's just a mess.  There is much confusion and conflation between de re and de dicto modal ascriptions.  The last line of this quote should be evidence of that!

Furthermore, to show how real the distinction between 'necessity of consequence' and 'necessity of consequent' is, let '[]' stand for 'it is necessary that'.  Then by 'necessity of consequence', we mean the kind of necessity that holds in the following:

    [1]  [](P --> Q).

So if God has infallible knowledge about the future, then:

   [2]  [](Yesterday God believed that R --> R).

However, the necessity of the thing consequent would yield:

  [3]  []R.

Given that [2] and [3] mean very different things, the distinction seems to be important, for the defender of free-will can accept [2] and yet reject [3].  Moreover, [2] does not yield [3] unless we add some further premise,

    [4] [](Yesterday God believed that R),

and some transfer principle along the lines of the following,

    [5] []P & [](P-->Q) |= []Q.

And [3] follows from [2],[4], and [5].  But defenders of free-will can accept God's infallible foreknowledge (thereby retaining [2]) and yet deny the fatalist conclusion [3].  For instance, those inspired by Boethius and Ockham can deny [4] (for different reasons), and those inspired by Molina can deny [5] (though I agree with those who think that Molinism does not entail the denial of [5]).

All this to say, Luther was being too hasty in his response to Erasmus.  Of course it may be true that humans do not have the kind of freedom that libertarians think we possess.  This is a difficult and complex issue, one that is worthy of philosophical inquiry; but I suspect that it does not bear much weight regarding our "knowledge of Christianity".

Luther's Righteousness: quite alien

As is well known in Lutheran theology, there are two distinct types of righteousness:  [i] alien righteousness (cool name!), and [ii] proper righteousness (Luther Two Kinds of Righteousness).  In his Commentary on Galatians, Luther regards the distinction as one between passive righteousness and active righteousness (which map on to [i] and [ii], respectively).

We can define alien righteousness as the righteousness of Christ which is imputed into us and acquired by means of faith alone--it is not earned by the human individual.  And we can define proper righteousness as our righteousness which is in response to Christ's righteousness in us, and it is this latter righteousness which produces (good) works.  Proper righteousness is the "product" or "fruit and consequence" of alien righteousness.  Even more, Luther describes alien righteousness as "heavenly" and concerns the new man, whereas proper righteousness is "earthly" and concerns the old man.

Luther considers alien/passive righteousness as superior to proper/active righteousness, where the former is wholly due to Christ by which we are brought into salvation.  Proper righteousness, although inferior, is nevertheless necessary for the whole of the Christian life.

A few concerns regarding Luther's framework.  First of all, when Christ's righteousness is imputed into the human individual, is the individual actually made righteous or is it entirely external?  That is, is there an internal change in the believer, or is there no such change?*

Consider the following.  Suppose I take a test, and I fail due to my ignorance.  Now suppose person S takes the test and obtains an A grade.  When the teacher is about to look at the score, S substitutes his grade for mine; furthermore, the teacher looks at my test and instead of looking at my answers, only looks at the substituted A-grade and therefore permits me to pass the class.

Although I received an A and passed the course, this grade is entirely external of me, for nothing has changed within me due to this exchange of grades.  In fact, I could have been entirely unaware that S substituted the grades, and happily I look at my report card at some later time to find out about passing the course.

Is Christ's imputation of his righteousness akin to S's substitution of grades?

If it is, then I find it hard to see how this fits in with the notion of new creation and spiritual transformation (cf. 1 Corinthians, Romans 6, Romans 12, 2 Peter).  That is, the primary conception of justification as merely a change in legal status (the F-to-A-grade-model such that the change is purely external) seems problematic from a Biblical framework (even some Protestants would agree, cf. N.T. Wright, Dallas Willard).  This is not to say there is no such change in legal status, but that salvation depicted in the Scriptures includes more than that.

On the other hand, if we are actually made righteous in the sense that there is a genuine internal change, then such an account is consonant with RC's conception of justification (more on this some other time).  Moreover, RC agrees with Luther insofar as both alien and proper righteousness are necessary elements in the Christian life, which includes an element of passivity with respect to righteousness.  For the Catholic agrees that Christ's life and activity is a sufficient cause of our initial justification, which is co-extensive with Luther's imputation of alien righteousness.  One cannot be saved by their own wits and devices (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas' claim that we cannot move towards God by our own accord).

For RC, the infusion of righteousness is not merely extrinsic to the subject but involves a genuine, internal change.  One key difference however is that RC would disregard the artificial distinction between alien righteousness and proper righteousness, where both are not to be treated as completely separate as Luther conceived but are both states or effects of the same thing, viz. the Holy Spirit's activity by which Christ's very life is brought about in the Christian.

To take this to the example given above, the activity of person S in our life is not merely to provide for us a passing grade but to remove our ignorance--S doesn't just give me the answers but helps me become the person who can proffer the right answers.  The Spirit's activity does not merely give us a "get-into-heaven-for-free" pass but involves His transforming work of the entire human personality such that we become "partakers in the divine nature" (2 Peter), thereby becoming new creatures--"for by one offering He has perfected for all time those who are being sanctified" (Hebrews 10:14).  So S does not merely give us his A-grade but aids and enables us to become the kind of person who can merit the A grade.  Jesus is not merely here to get us into heaven but is making us into His very image--we are becoming little Christs (as Peter Kreeft likes to say).  Thus, the divine allowance of our entrance into His family is not just an external change but includes a transformation of internal reality.  And such transformation is not by our doing but is a matter of what God is doing in us.

Thus, either Luther is saying nothing contradictory to the Catholic (though RC would add to it), or he does have a conception in tension with RC, but one that puts a strain on the notion of spiritual formation and new creation as conveyed in the Scriptures.


*(given my earlier complaint between Luther's use of 'internal', I should explain what I mean by my use here.  By 'internal' change, I mean that at one time an agent R lacks a certain property P and gains P at some later time (or R has a certain property P* at one time and loses it at another time), where P's being instantiated by R can be considered irrespective of R's relation to other concrete particulars--though the fact that R has P may be the result of some other entity O such that R could not instantiate P unless O were to cause or make it so.  By 'external', I mean a change in R that cannot be considered independent of R's relation to other concrete objects.  So an internal change would include my losing an arm (so by 'internal', I just don't mean things concerning the "soul", whatever that is), feeling melancholy to feeling elated (even if the cause of such a change is some other object such as the comedian Tim Hawkins), etc.  An external change would include the change of distance from where I am located and where President Obama is located as he is flying on Air Force One, becoming a widow(er), etc.)